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Chapter 11
THAILAND
Kingdom of Thailand
Area: 513,114 km2
Population: 64.76 million (July 2005)
Capital: Bangkok
Language: Thai, Lao, Chinese, Malay
Religion: Theravada Buddhism and Islam 
Government type: Constitutional monarchy
Head of state: King Bhumibol Adulyadej
Currency: baht (US$1 = 40.29 baht; 2005 average)
Fiscal year: October–September
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A t the beginning of 2005, the Thai Rak Thai Party won a landslide vic-tory in the Thai general election and Prime Minister Thaksin set up
the first one-party government in the political history of Thailand.
Thaksin started his second administration on what was thought to be the
strongest of foundations, but there soon occurred an accumulation of the
problems inherent in the first administration, including the making of pri-
vate profits by those close to the prime minister, the control of free speech
in matters concerning the prime minister, and strong-arm political tactics.
Taking 2005 as a whole, the government suffered mounting instability.
After November 2005, political meetings calling for the resignation of the
prime minister were held on a growing scale, even to point where
Thaksin’s position began to look precarious.
So far as the economy was concerned, the annual growth rate of GDP,
at 4.5 percent, was lower than the 6.2 percent registered in 2004, suggest-
ing that the boom was entering a stage of adjustment. The Thai economy
was beset by three problems, namely the effects of the Indian Ocean
tsunami at the end of 2004, an outbreak of avian influenza (bird flu), and
a deterioration in law and order in the three southern border provinces. In
the midst of these events, pressure was felt from rising world interest rates
and from high crude oil prices, while the rise in private investment and
private consumption began to falter. Meanwhile, the government took a
number of measures that adversely affected the economy during the latter
half of the year. These included decisions to liberalize light-oil prices and
increase interest rates, the latter aimed at controlling inflation after a
sharp hike in retail prices. As the mainstay of its economic recovery pol-
The Second Thaksin
Administration: From
Victory to Turn-around to
Instability
TSURUYO FUNATSU
290
icy, the government in October embarked on a large-scale infrastructure
development plan involving total funding of 1,700 billion baht.
As regards external relations, continued efforts were made to conclude
bilateral trade agreements, a policy inherited from the first Thaksin
administration. Moreover in 2005, the plan for nominating Deputy Prime
Minister Surakiart as the next secretary general of the United Nations was
taken up in earnest, and to this end an energetic top-level foreign policy
was developed. In addition, there were increasingly frequent expressions
of international concern over the administration’s tough posture toward
the problem of insurgency in the southern provinces, and the resultant
violation of human rights by the Thaksin administration with respect to
the Muslim population of those provinces, a matter to which the Thai
government was anxious to respond. As regards the problem of the south-
ern provinces, relations with Malaysia had been strained since 2004 and
grew even worse in 2005.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
In the February 2005 general election, the Thai Rak Thai Party (hereafter
the TRT Party) won almost three quarters of the seats, and the second
Thaksin administration got under way with the biggest majority in
Thailand’s political history. However before long, the problems that had
dogged the first administration resurfaced. These included allegations of
prime ministerial nepotism, suspicions that cabinet ministers were
becoming embroiled in misconduct, questions over the purchase of media
outlets, and apprehension concerning the tough measures being
employed by the government to maintain law and order in the southern
provinces. In Bangkok, intellectuals, the media and the middle class took
the lead in expressing dissatisfaction with suspected scandals in the
administration, and with the government’s strong-arm tactics. The ques-
tion of the “cronyism” that accompanied the long tenure of political
power began to be widely discussed. In September, Sondhi Limthongkul,
the founder of the newspaper Phujadkarn, emerged as an important critic
of the administration. Sondhi hosted a regular live television talk show in
Bangkok’s Lumpini Park attacking the prime minister, a development that
began to widen to take on the scale of a political convention.
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The February General Election and the Historic Victory of
the Thai Rak Thai Party
In the House of Representatives election of February 6th, the main point
of interest was how many votes had been won by the Thaksin administra-
tion following its first fixed four-year term of office. Moreover the election
had a broader political significance, in that the Thaksin administration
was the first fully operative government to hold power under the 1997
Constitution, whose aim was to establish political stability in Thailand,
and the election was a test of whether or not the new system was an
appropriate one. 
In the contest for the general election, there were four parties putting
forward more than 100 candidates. These were the TRT Party, the
Democrat Party, the Chart Thai Party, and the newly formed Mahachan
Party.  In addition to these, there were 20 parties fielding some candidates
for single-member constituencies, and 20 parties contesting proportional-
representation constituencies.
Insofar as could be seen from the results of the 2004 election for the
Governorship of Bangkok and from public opinion polls taken before and
after September, the TRT Party’s rate of support in the urban areas was
languishing. But by the end of the year, thanks to the popularity of an
extension of the poverty eradication program aimed at agricultural vil-
lages, and of the policy for strengthening national competitiveness aimed
at urban voters, support for the government had recovered. On February
4, immediately before the election, Thaksin delivered a speech in the
Sanam Luang Park and asked for support for the TRT Party, and he
defended the record of his first administration in the following terms:
I have caused the economy to develop further. I have raised the GDP
from 4.8 trillion baht to 6.5 trillion baht. I will see if I can raise it still
further, to 9 trillion baht. I will increase the country’s exports and fur-
ther open up markets, and will resolve economic problems by doing
away with the issue of poverty. I have put a stop to the IMF loan. I
have transformed Thailand from a country concerned with debt pay-
ments into a nation that is a net lender.
The results of the election became clear following recounts in two
places, ordered by the Election Commission, on February 20. The TRT
Party emerged with a monopoly of the seats in 42 of the country’s 75 pre-
fectures (changwat) and had won a historic one-party victory, sweeping
the board by winning 377 of the 500 seats at stake. As Table 11.1 shows,
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the TRT party won 129 more seats than it had won in the previous elec-
tion, and even in Bangkok, it had increased the number of seats by a
greater total than had been predicted. By contrast, in the southern part of
the country, TRT won only one seat and in particular, it won no seats at
all in the three southern border provinces in which terror-related prob-
lems had been occurring. This shows the animosity toward the TRT
among the people of the southern provinces. 
The Democrat Party, which was the main opposition party, had
stressed the need to put a brake on the strong-arm tactics of the Thaksin
administration, and had aimed to win over 200 seats as a vote of no-
confidence in the prime minister. However, in this election, the policy
platform of the Democrats lacked a clear identity, and they failed, more-
over, to extinguish from people’s memories the unpopular economy pol-
icy of the former Chuan Leekpai administration. For these reasons, they
lost 32 of the seats that they had won in the previous election. Banyat
Bantadtan, the leader of the Democrats, took responsibility for the party’s
defeat and resigned, and in March, Abhisit Vejjajiva took over as new
party leader. Meanwhile two powerful factions of the Chart Thai Party,
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 Table 11.1. 2005 General Election Results, by Party, Region, 
 and Number of Seats Won
Bangkok TotalCentral
Thailand
Northern
Thailand
Southern
Thailand
Northeast
Thailand
Proportional
Represen-
tation
seats
Total
Number
of Seats
Single-member Constituency Seats
TRT Party
Democrat
 Party
Chart Thai 
 Party
Mahachon
 Party
Others
Total
32
4
1
0
–
37
80
7
10
0
–
97
71
5
0
0
–
76
1
52
1
0
–
54
126
2
6
2
–
136
310
(200)
70
(97)
18
(35)
2
(-)
0
(68)
400
67
(48)
26 
(31)
7
(6)
–
0
(15)
100
377
(248)
96
(128)
25
(41)
2
(-)
0
(83)
500
Source: Compiled by the author from newspaper reports based on information issued in 
February by the Election Commission.
Note: Figures in brackets show the number of those elected in the 2001 election.
which had formed part of the coalition led by Thaksin, were pulled into
the TRT, and for a while there were even rumors that the Chart Thai Party
might merge with TRT. However, with the party leader Banharn Silpa-
archa playing a central role, the party was reorganized, secured 25 seats in
the election, and left the administration. Meanwhile the Mahachan Party,
a new party formed mainly around Sanan Kachonprasat who had left the
Democrats in 2004, had hoped to win over 20 seats, mainly in the north-
east, but in the end it suffered a crushing defeat, winning only two seats.
In the first half of 2005, there were very few people who called into
question the administration’s stated intention to serve for more than 12
years. At the time of the inauguration of the second administration, Prime
Minister Thaksin stated that in carrying out his second mandate, he
would moderate the hard line that he had followed during his first admin-
istration and that he would listen to criticisms of his method of govern-
ment. This change in direction was welcomed by the mass media and the
intellectuals, but after two or three months, the honeymoon period was
already over, and the problems inherent in the first administration soon
revealed themselves again.
Suspicions of Corruption and the Cabinet Reshuffle
The biggest criticism leveled at the first Thaksin administration was the
allegation that the prime minister and his cabinet colleagues were using
their positions to gain financially. In particular, it was said that the poli-
cies and projects of the first administration were bringing financial bene-
fits to specific business families that were either placed within the admin-
istration, or had links with it. Similar suspicions surfaced in 2005, and
concerned the construction of the Suvarnabhumi New Airport, a project
that was being publicized throughout the entire nation. Confidence in the
Thaksin administration took another blow.
On April 25th, the newspaper Prachachart Thurakij published an arti-
cle on a scandal in which politicians and civil servants had been accepting
bribes in the purchase of CTX (explosive detection) equipment for the
new airport. The opposition presented a motion of no-confidence in the
cabinet in which the main member responsible for the airport was Suriya
Jungrungreangkit, the minister of transport, and on June 27th, the motion
was debated in parliament. Since the TRT Party enjoyed an overwhelming
majority in parliament, Suriya’s survival of the vote was a foregone con-
clusion, but immediately afterwards, the results of the ABAC Poll, a public
opinion poll held by Assumption University, were made known. These
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showed that 56 percent of the respondents had no confidence in
Transport Minister Suriya, while 16 percent had confidence in him and 28
percent were undecided, those having no confidence in the minister thus
being in a clear majority. Moreover within the TRT Party, opposition to
the prime minister began to surface and the party’s chief adviser, Sano
Thianthong, objected to the view that the vote on this no-confidence
motion was binding, and on the day of the debate declared himself absent
from parliament on sick leave. On the following day, Sano was deprived of
his post in the party.
The next blow to strike the TRT was an allegation of corruption con-
cerning Thaksin’s natural sister, Yaowaret. Alongkorn Ponlabutr, deputy
leader of the Democrat Party, declared that he suspected that Yaowaret
was guilty of receiving money from companies making a bid for managing
the car parks and supplying furniture at the new airport. In July, he regis-
tered a complaint in connection with this matter with the police.
Problems relating to the airport apart, in June 2005 Picnic Corporation, a
gas and engineering company run by the younger brother of Suriya
Lapvisuthisin, the deputy minister of commerce, was accused of illegally
window-dressing its financial results, and the said deputy minister had no
alternative but to resign. This series of corruption allegations conveyed
the impression of a government lacking in transparency, in which the
most important posts were taken up by people from the business world,
and criticisms of the way in which members of the administration were
guided by the profit motive began to grow in strength.
In an attempt to fend off the blows falling on the administration, in
August Prime Minister Thaksin carried out a reshuffle of his cabinet, only
five months after the inauguration of the second administration. The
problematic transport minister, Suriya, was moved sideways to become
deputy prime minister as well as minister for industry, and some 19 cabi-
net posts changed hands in a reshuffle that included the arrival of three
new ministers. However the dropping of Suriya, requested by the opposi-
tion, did not come to pass, and the restructured cabinet included two new
members who were close to the prime minister and his wife, namely
Police General Chainan Charoensiri and Air Chief Marshal Kongsak
Vantana. The image of the administration remained unreformed.
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The Problem of Insurgency in the Southern Border
Provinces: A Deepening Quagmire
The government’s hard-line reaction to the unrest in the southern border
provinces was another factor that weakened support for the administra-
tion. Prime Minister Thaksin, in radio addresses given to the people on
December 17, 2004 and before the election, touched on the problem of
attacks by armed Islamic groups and showed confidence in the next
administration’s ability to expose criminal groups. Moreover at the time of
the inauguration of the second administration, the government set up a
National Reconciliation Commission, aimed at achieving a reconcilement
with the southern Muslims. This development had some appeal, in that it
suggested that the administration might be groping toward a policy of
peaceful settlement of the problem.
However in reality, during 2005 progress had still to be made in the
identification and capture of criminal groups, while terrorist incidents
increased in frequency. Moreover the geographical incidence of terrorist
attacks spread from the border provinces in which trouble had occurred
hitherto (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) into the two neighbouring
provinces of Songkhla and Satun. As is shown in Tables 11.2 and 11.3,
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Table 11.2. Number of Incidents in the Five Southern Provinces 
of Thailand (January to July 2005)
No. of Incidents
Planting and throwing of bombs
Discovery of  dangerous substances?and explosives
Arson and fire-related incidents
Armed attacks and shootings of officials and authorities
Armed attacks and shootings of citizens
Armed attacks and shootings of priests and monks
Bullet injuries
Kidnappings and abductions
Robbery of guns and arms
Damage to property
Burglaries
Total
249
76
611
504
660
7
56
3
30
48
14
2,258
Source: Materials from Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (February 
2006).
Note: The five southern provinces comprise the “three southern provinces,” namely, 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, together with Songkhla and Satun.
from January to July 2005 inclusive, there were many terrorist attacks on
civilian targets. Deaths related to terrorist attacks in the southern
provinces increased from 382 for the whole of 2004 to 348 in the first half
of 2005 (584 for the whole year) while the number of those wounded
increased dramatically from 577 for the whole of 2004 to 672 in the first
half of 2005 (1,060 for the whole year). This situation led the Thaksin
administration to resume its hard-line policy from July 2005 onward, a
decision that caused a fiercely hostile swing against the government in
public opinion, while in the three southern provinces, a state of emer-
gency was proclaimed.  However there was no restoration of law and
order and these steps invited criticism from the international community. 
The insurgency in the south consisted of the following kinds of violent
activity: (1) large-scale terrorist incidents, tantamount to organized crime,
carried out by Islamic terrorist groups; (2) everyday acts of violence tar-
geted against civilians; (3) intimidation and violence directed at Muslims
who were cooperating with the government; and (4) hostility toward the
army and the police at local community level.
Incidents of large-scale terrorism included a series of bombings, of a
department store, of the airport and of other targets in Hat Yai in
Songkhla Province on April 3, and the destruction of an electricity power
transformer in Yala Province, accompanied by simultaneous terrorist inci-
dents, on July 14.  In addition to these, on October 26 there were attacks
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Table 11.3. Changes in the Number of People Killed and Wounded in the Five Southern 
Border Provinces of Thailand (Calendar Year 2004; January to July inclusive 2005)
Source: Same as for Table 11.2.
Note: See Table 11.2.
Killed Wounded Killed Wounded
2004
(Calendar Year)
2005 
(Jan. to July inclusive)
Army and police personnel
Civilian officials
Volunteer corps members
Local politicians
Village headmen and 
?assistant officials
Monks and trainee monks
Ordinary civilians
Total
90
30
14
7
25
4
212
382
194
24
26
7
19
1
305
577
30
22
6
15
12
0
263
348
136
37
15
6
26
1
451
672
at 63 places in the three southern border provinces by terrorists, partly
aimed at the theft of arms. So far as everyday acts of violence were con-
cerned, attacks began to be launched against places that hitherto had been
considered out-of-bounds. New targets of this sort included a Buddhist
monastery and local higher education institutions, places that were sym-
bolic of “Thai-ness.”
Intimidation of and violence against Muslims took the form of retalia-
tion against Muslims who had given information on criminals to the Thai
authorities. Moreover, in early August, shopkeepers in the three south-
ern border provinces were warned by an Islamic fundamentalist sect not
to open their premises on Fridays, and attacks were launched on shop-
keepers who refused to heed the warning. Muslim community leaders
and the prime minister asked shopkeepers to run their businesses as
usual, arguing that there is no need to obey a prohibition on working
that comes from those with no Islamic doctrinal authority, but anxious
about their own safety, the shopkeepers observed voluntary restraints on
opening their premises. Hostility toward the authorities permeated
throughout Muslim communities as a result of the security policies of the
army and the police, and in consequence of the excessive nature of
searches, as well as of mistaken arrests and violence by the authorities.
Symbolic of the hostility at local level was the capture and beating to
death, in a village of Rangae district in Narathiwat on 20 September
2005, of two Thai Marine soldiers, whose faces were well known
throughout the rural communities of the surrounding area. This event
shocked the whole of Thailand.
In the midst of the unrest, Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam
announced that an Emergency Decree on Public Administration in
Emergency Situation, B.E. 2548 (2005), be issued on July 16, applicable
to the three southern provinces for a period of three months (it was
renewed in the following October). In November, the state of emergency
was extended to Songkhla Province. The emergency decree concentrated
a great deal of authority in the hands of the prime minister, and this
caused a fierce reaction in public opinion, beginning with the opposition
parties, the mass media, and the intellectuals. On 28 July, Prime Minister
Thaksin appeared on television with Anand Panyarachun, a former prime
minister and chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, and
was obliged to explain that the proclamation of a state of emergency did
not signify an abandonment of peaceful approaches, but was a measure
taken to protect the civilian population from violence.
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Moreover, as an initiative toward eliminating everyday acts of terror,
Queen Sirikit, speaking at the end of October, argued for the need to orga-
nize community-level police groups, while training ordinary citizens in
the use of weapons of self-defense was begun.
Doubts over Media Acquisition and the Control of Mass
Communications
The Thaksin administration exerts control over media that are critical of
it, and is known for its containment of the potential for criticism.
Following the emergence of the Thaksin administration, Thai journalism,
which boasted a high level of freedom even by the liberal standards of
Southeast Asia of the 1990s, imposed on itself voluntary self-restraint as
regards criticism of the government, and among intellectuals critical of
the government, this restraint on the freedom of information became a
target of attack. 
A variety of methods were reportedly used by the TRT Party and Prime
Minister Thaksin to control the media. Steps that were explicitly designed
for media control included the purchase of a 40 percent share in the tele-
vision company iTV and the banning of printed media such as the Far
Eastern Economic Review (January 10, 2002) and The Economist (March
10, 2002). Not only were actions for libel brought against NGO activists
and others (and on July 16, 2003, in the civil and criminal courts, against
Ms. Supinya Klangnarong over an article in Thai Post) but more indirect
means, too, were practiced as a means of control. These included investi-
gation into the finances of newspaper and television staff who had been
critical of the government, the suspension of documentary review pro-
grams with content critical of the government, and the reduction of adver-
tising fees paid by public corporations.
On September12, 2005, the prime minister and his close friend
Phaiboon Damrongchaitham, founder of the entertainment company
GMM Grammy Inc., announced that it was the intention of GMM Media,
a subsidiary of Grammy, to acquire a large number of shares in two big
newspaper companies, namely Matichon Company and Post Publishing
Public Company Ltd. GMM Media proceeded to buy enough stock on
September 12 and 13 to become the major shareholder of both the target
companies, and on September 13 announced that its aim was to give its
business group a comprehensive range of interests including newspaper
businesses making a stable revenue. However, there was strong public
opposition to the takeover led by citizens’ groups, intellectuals, and
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members of the Upper House, all of whom were alarmed at the purchase
of leading newspapers of well-established quality and the implications of
this purchase for the freedom of information in Thailand. The outcome
was that on September 16, GMM media changed its plans and reduced its
holdings in Matichon to 20 percent by selling shares back to the newspa-
per company. It was supposed by most of the media that the attempted
purchase of the newspapers was based on political motives, and stemmed
from the deep personal connections between the prime minister and
Phaiboon. This incident encapsulated one kind of information control
being carried out under the TRT administration. The repercussions of
the affair were very substantial and it again exposed to criticism the
administration’s intervention in the media, and its authoritarian charac-
ter generally.
The Anti-Thaksin Movement of Sondhi Limthongkul
In the midst of these various developments, the administration’s control
of the media suffered a setback in the form of a fierce antigovernment
movement which ultimately wrought great changes. On September 15,
the broadcast on Channel 9 of the current affairs review programme
“Muang Thai Rai Sapda” (Thailand weekly) was cancelled on the ground
that it seemed to cast doubt on the prime minister’s loyalty toward the
King. Sondhi Limthongkul, the anchorman of the programme and the
founder of the newspaper Phujadkarn, thereupon moved to Bangkok’s
Lumpini Park, where he assembled an audience for a live talk show. He
engaged in continual criticism of the prime minister during the show, giv-
ing particular attention to the administration’s strong-arm tactics, and air-
ing the suspicions that the prime minister’s family was abusing its politi-
cal power. Moreover he began his attack by accusing the prime minister of
having threatened the authority of the King. This claim was conveyed to
every part of Thailand via the media outlets and cable television networks
belonging to the Phujadkarn group, and had nationwide repercussions.
Instead of arguing against the accusations, Prime Minister Thaksin
launched a large number of libel suits against Sondhi. For his part, Sondhi
emphasised his royalist stance, ignored warnings that he was guilty of lése
majesté toward the King, and appealed to the masses, under the slogan
“Let’s return power from the prime minister to the King.” By November,
the crowds attending the live show in Lumpini Park had grown to tens of
thousands. With the addition of a teachers’ movement which shared anti-
Thaksin sentiments, on December 9 the crowd in Lumpini Park reached
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80,000. However, there were many who expressed doubts about Sondhi,
who had formerly been a supporter of the Thaksin administration, and
there were also many newspapers which suggested that behind Sondhi’s
public stance lay a feud between him and Thaksin, marked by personal
grudges, and that Sondhi was also driven by business motives.
On the evening of December 4, the day before his birthday, the King
gave a speech in which he told the prime minister to be more tolerant of
criticism, and on December 6, Thaksin, in an attempt to cool things
down, withdrew his defamation lawsuits against Sondhi. Following this,
on December 23, the crowd gathered in Lumpini Park shrank to about
10,000, and for a while people began to think that the anti-Thaksin move-
ment had come to a premature end.
In the end, the decisive event that changed matters was the sale of
shares in SHIN Corporation, revealed in January 2006. On January 23,
2006, it was announced that SHIN Corporation had sold those of its
shares that were owned by the Thaksin family (49.6 percent of the total
amount of SHIN Corporation shares) to Temasek Holdings of Singapore,
an investment company connected with the Singapore government
(Bangkok Post, January 24, 2006). The value of the shares sold amounted
to 73.3 billion baht, which made the transaction one of the biggest
merger-and-acquisition deals ever carried out in the communications
business field in Southeast Asia. The prime minister said, “This is an ulti-
mate step taken after family discussion, and may be seen as one of the best
ways for dispelling doubts about the family business.” However immedi-
ately after the sale, criticisms were expressed firstly over the fact that the
huge profits obtained from the sale were not subject to tax, and secondly
to the effect that the sale of satellite communications enterprises and
mobile telephone businesses, both categories being related to the national
good, was “the act of a traitor.” 
In these circumstances, the anti-Thaksin movement spread very
rapidly beyond the gathering that had been led by Sondhi, with organizers
of citizens’ groups and political activists such as Chamlong Srimuang
joining the ranks of the movement’s leadership. During February 2006,
the membership of the anti-Thaksin movement, though centered in the
capital region, spread quickly to include more and more people in every
part of Thailand. The prime minister has rejected demands from the anti-
Thaksin movement for his resignation, and has insisted that “this admin-
istration has won the support of the whole nation by way of a general
election” and “the only juncture that would persuade me to leave this
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administration would be if it were the will of the King, who is the head of
state.” On February 24, 2006, the House of Representatives was dissolved,
and the prime minister began an election campaign determined to win
power once more after the election of April 2. Whether or not Prime
Minister Thaksin can overcome the crisis and retain his position depends
on the outcome of the election, on the future development of the anti-
Thaksin movement, and on the evolving relationship between him and
the conventional Thai elite which included individuals such as Prem
Tinsulanonda, Privy Council president, who received petitions from the
anti-Thaksin movement and intellectuals intending at all costs to prevent
Thaksin serving again as prime minister.
ECONOMY
According to a report of the National Economic and Social Development
Board (hereafter NESDB), published on March 6, 2006, the real annual
rate of GDP growth (year-on-year) in 2005 was 4.5 percent, below the 6.2
percent registered in 2004. This figure was below the government’s esti-
mate given at the start of the year (6.1 percent, given by the Finance
Ministry in January) and below the NESDB’s estimate, given in March, of
between 5.5 percent and 6.5 percent, and gave the impression that the
economic boom that had been underway since 2002 had entered an
adjustment phase.
If the GDP growth rate is examined on a quarter-by-quarter basis,
growth in the first quarter (year-on-year) stayed at 3.2 percent, but picked
up in the second to fourth quarters, registering figures of 4.6 percent, 5.3
percent, and 4.7 percent, respectively. From the third quarter onward,
there were optimistic signs, including an improvement in the balance of
trade, buoyancy among the exporting industries, and a recovery in tourist
receipts. 
In 2005, various factors came together to depress the growth rate of
the economy. These included the reappearance of the risk factor of avian
influenza, an insurgency in the three southern border provinces, a sharp
hike in oil prices, and a rise in interest rates, as well as natural disasters
such as the Indian Ocean tsunami, and drought conditions and flooding
within Thailand. All of these factors prompted a rise in inflation. Among
them, the rise in oil prices had a particularly strong effect, and in the sec-
ond half of 2005, the acceleration of inflation and an increase in interest
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rates caused a slowdown in the growth of private consumption and pri-
vate investment. The private consumption index for 2005 stagnated, with
a rise of only 0.6 percent (the increase in 2004 was 3.9 percent) and sales
of durable and nondurable consumer goods were adversely affected. The
number of automobiles sold, cars being typical of consumer products gen-
erally, fell by 11.2 percent. However commercial vehicle sales increased
over the previous year by 12.4 percent. The private investment index,
meanwhile, showed an increase of 8.6 percent, down from the 10.0 per-
cent registered in 2004, and whereas capital investment continued to rise
without interruption, the increase in construction investment began to
decelerate markedly.
The 2005 trade balance went into deficit for the first time since 1997,
the size of the deficit being US$8,578 million (the 2004 balance regis-
tered a surplus of US$1,460 million. See Figure 11.1). Moreover the neg-
ative trade balance dragged the current account into a deficit of
US$3,714 million.
So far as the individual sectors of GDP were concerned, agriculture,
adversely affected by a long-lasting drought, showed negative rates of
change of -8.7 percent in the first quarter and 4.2 percent in the second.
In the third and fourth quarters, agriculture’s growth rate fell to 4.4 per-
cent and -0.2 percent, respectively. During the second to the fourth quar-
ters inclusive, the manufacturing sector held firm, showing growth rates
of 6.5 percent, 6.4 percent, and 6.0 percent, respectively. The construc-
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Figure 11.1. Changes in Thailand’s Trade Balance, 2001–5
(US$ million)
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Source: Compiled from Bank of Thailand statistics.
tion sector, by contrast, suffered from the effects of high interest rates,
and its growth rates contracted sharply, from 9.6 percent in the second
quarter to 2.9 percent and 3.0 percent in the third and fourth quarters,
respectively. The index of manufacturing output stood at 155.4 (the year
2000 = 100), an increase of 9.2 percent over the previous year, but down
on the 11.5 increase rate registered in 2004. According to the Bank of
Thailand, industry that was geared to domestic demand showed a slower
growth rate. Whereas industries that were over 60 percent reliant on
exports enjoyed annual growth rates that were in double figures (28.8
percent in the third quarter), industries less than 30 percent reliant on
exports showed negative growth rates from the third quarter. The types of
industry that enjoyed high growth rates were those associated with
exports, and included electronics, automobiles, petrochemicals, processed
marine products, and canned vegetables and fruit. By contrast, textiles,
leather, electrical appliances, and iron and steel all showed lower growth
rates. However, capacity utilization in 2005 maintained a high rate of 72.6
percent and was particularly high in industries such as paper and paper
products and constructional materials. The Indian Ocean tsunami, which
occurred at the end of 2004, adversely affected tourism earnings (interna-
tional balance based), which shrank by 6.2 percent year-on-year in the
first quarter, but which rebounded to register 4.4 percent growth in the
second quarter.
Thailand’s export performance remained firm, with the value of
exports for the year amounting to US$109.2 billion, a rise of 15.1 percent
over 2004. So far as the recipients of Thailand’s exports were concerned,
as in 2004 the top three destinations were the United States, Japan, and
China. The share of the United States (15.4 percent of Thai exports) and
Japan (13.7 percent) remained little changed from 2004 (United States
16.4 percent, Japan 14.0 percent) but the share of Thai exports taken by
China increased, from 7.4 percent in 2004 to 8.3 percent in 2005, equiva-
lent to a year-on-year increase rate of 29 percent. Exports such as comput-
ers and computer parts, motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts, and
petrochemical products all did well, but exports of agro-industry prod-
ucts, and agricultural commodities such as rice, sugar, tapioca, and refrig-
erated poultry meat all shrank from the previous year’s levels.
Imports showed an increase in value of 26 percent to US$118.2 bil-
lion. Crude oil prices continued at a high level, and oil imports were
affected by buying in anticipation of the government’s abolition of the
subsidy on light-oil prices. The outcome was that oil imports increased
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substantially.  Steel and gold imports also increased. So far as the sources
of Thailand’s imports were concerned, the chief suppliers were Japan
(22.1 percent of Thai imports), China (9.4 percent), and the United States
(7.4 percent). Imports from China increased by 37 percent over the 2004
level.
During 2005, there was a rally in foreign direct investment. According
to the Thai Board of Investment (BOI), in 2005 the number of cases of for-
eign direct investment amounted to 1,196 (1,071 in 2004) and the value
of the investments was 465 billion baht (445.2 billion baht in 2004). In
fact in 2005, foreign investment reached its highest level for four years.
Japan was the most important source of foreign direct investment, with
354 cases or 37 percent of the entire value, followed by Malaysia (36
cases, 4.4 percent) and Taiwan (57 cases, 3.5 percent).
The capital account showed a marked improvement over the previous
year, registering a surplus of US$7.5 billion. Overseas liabilities increased
from US$51.1 billion at the end of 2004 to US$51.4 billion at the end of
2005, but the inward flow of foreign capital increased from US$49.8 bil-
lion in 2004 to US$52.0 billion in 2005, ensuring maintenance of external
stability.
The increase in consumer prices in 2005 gathered pace in the second
half of the year. In particular, liberalization of light-oil prices (see below)
had a sharp impact on prices, and for the year as a whole, the inflation
rate was 4.5 percent (2.7 percent in 2004). In the latter half of the year,
the inflation rate was especially high, reaching 6.2 percent in October.
Partly because of the central bank’s concern to restrain inflation, and
partly because the United States raised interest rates on federal funds, offi-
cial interest rates in Thailand (14-day repo rates) were raised on six occa-
sions during the year. Because of this, the central bank’s base rate
increased from 2.0 percent in January 2005 to 4.0 percent by the end of
the year.
Toward Abolition of the Light-oil Subsidy
On January 10, 2004, in an attempt to ameliorate the effects of high world
oil prices, the Thai government introduced a price maintenance policy
which imposed an upper limit on domestic prices of gasoline and light oil.
The difference between the real price and the official price was supposed
to be made good by way of an oil fund, and it was hoped that the resultant
deficit would be eliminated by the difference between the real oil price
and the maintained domestic oil price that would emerge after world oil
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prices had fallen. However world oil prices continued to rise, to a level far
beyond what the government had envisaged, and worried about the finan-
cial problems stemming from the swift enlargement of the trade deficit
and the accumulating deficit in the oil fund, in October 2004 the govern-
ment halted the subsidy on gasoline prices. But the subsidy on the price of
light oil, an important commodity for many households, was continued.
However on May 31, the cabinet decided to abolish the subsidy on light
oil after it had run for another ten-month period, and then at a further
meeting on July 12, decided to bring forward the date to July 13. At the
same time, the Ministry of Energy recommended the use of alternative
types of energy (natural gas, gasohol) and promoted a reduction in the
amount of time needed to get light oil on to the market. But because of the
length of the period during which light oil had been subsidized, reduction
in consumption took some time, and the huge trade deficit and the accu-
mulated deficit in the oil fund attracted much criticism.
Megaprojects as a Means of Stimulating New Economic
Growth
The first Thaksin administration followed a plan which delivered growth
based on both internal and external demand, thus maintaining a prolon-
gation of the economic boom. One of the pillars of the expansion of inter-
nal demand was the populist policy, targeted at low income groups, of
raising purchasing power and of facilitating the exploitation of business
opportunities. However the populist policies of the first administration
eventually lost their novelty, and the second administration placed the
emphasis on implementing existing pledges. Moreover anxieties over the
increase in the government’s liabilities as well as doubts over the overall
investment effect of populist policies, brought about a narrowing in the
options available to the government.
To stimulate the economy, the government on December 7 decided to
raise the salaries of civil servants by 5 percent (with effect from October
1) and raised the minimum wage in Bangkok (with effect from August 1).
The effect of these measures was however limited. The policy that the sec-
ond administration pinned its hopes on as a means of reviving the eco-
nomic boom was the promotion of giant infrastructure projects, the con-
struction of which had been agreed under the first administration.
The cabinet formally agreed on the funds needed for the public works
program at its meeting held at Payao on June 14, undertaking to begin the
works in October 2005. Table 11.4 shows the investment plan as first pub-
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lished on June 14, and the amounts of funding by main categories of
expenditure (the contents of this table incorporate some corrections with
some elasticity according to circumstances). Of the seven categories listed,
spending on facilities for large-scale transportation projects constitutes the
biggest single share, and the total spending under this category includes a
plan to invest on a 277.41 km railway network in the Bangkok metropoli-
tan region. In addition, and with the aim of lowering transport costs to
improve competitiveness, investment is planned on roads, motorways,
developments surrounding the international airport, the ordering of new
aircraft, and the development of deep sea harbors. As regards the housing
sector, the proposals incorporate the provision of 450,000 new housing
units for lower-paid workers under the “ua atorn” (we care) housing plan.
The Ministry of Finance has calculated that the stimulus to the econ-
omy provided by government spending and private investment under the
megaprojects plan will add 0.5 percent to GDP growth rates over a five-
year period. On the other hand, the plan calls for imports of capital and
equipment which will adversely affect the current account, and if the
funding for the plan cannot be secured on favorable terms from within
Thailand, loans will have to be raised from domestic and overseas sources,
a possibility that gives grounds for concern. As a means of promoting the
megaproject plan, on December 14 Prime Minister Thaksin invited
ambassadors and representatives of international agencies to the prime
minister’s residence and announced to them the details of the “the
Kingdom of Thailand Modernization Framework,” abbreviated to KTMF.
On December 26, he invited 1,300 representatives from leading foreign
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Table 11.4.  The Mega-Project Plan: Planned Investment in Seven 
Categories (as published on 14 June 2005)
Source: Bangkok Post, June 15, 2005 and other newspaper articles.
2005
Mass transit facilities
Transport
Housing
Water supply
Education
Public health facilities
Other
   Total
1.13
34.72
14.81
0.00
0.20
1.60
14.83
67.29
2006
46.61
48.42
54.32
38.12
13.98
12.00
41.90
255.35
2007
98.06
81.40
64.06
53.96
27.43
27.31
96.40
486.16
2008
143.64
80.24
57.18
53.96
27.43
27.31
96.40
486.16
2009
133.99
83.83
23.43
53.96
27.38
26.27
115.57
464.43
2005–9
423.43
328.61
213.80
200.00
96.43
96.39
342.09
1,700.75
Total(%)
25
19
12
12
6
6
20
100
(Billion baht)
companies and investment firms to the prime minister’s residence and
explained the significance of KTMF in the following terms: K stands for
knowledge, T stands for technology, M for management, and F for
finance. At the same time, he invited his guests to participate actively in
the execution of the development plan. However the megaproject plan,
spanning as it did such a very wide field, continued to contain many ele-
ments that were unclear. Even the business plans for the development of
individual routes for large-scale transportation, and the modes of trans-
port to be involved lacked the necessary detail. In the confused political
situation that began to develop after the end of 2005, the question of
whether or not the plan for the much-debated megaprojects will survive
without alteration depends on the direction that the present administra-
tion is likely to take, and on its future priorities.
Reform of State Enterprises: The Court Judgment Banning
the Privatization of EGAT
As a step toward reforming Thailand’s state enterprises, Prime Minister
Thaksin promoted the listing of shares in the hitherto nationalized com-
panies on the stock exchange, and put forward six companies as candi-
dates for privatization. These included AOT (Airports of Thailand), PTT
(Petroleum Authority of Thailand), and MCOT (Mass Communications
Organization of Thailand). The largest of the plans put forward in 2005
by the government in its state enterprise reform program was however the
plan for privatizing EGAT (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand).
During 2004, the EGAT labor union strongly criticized the plan to priva-
tize EGAT and developed a movement to oppose it, describing the initia-
tive as “the stripping of a national asset” and “privatization tied to a rise in
electricity prices,” and the plan was temporarily shelved. However after
the landslide victory in the February general election, the government
side issued new guidelines and amended its policy to one that allows the
state to keep over 75 percent of the equity, thus making it easy to resusci-
tate the plan for privatizing EGAT at some future date. On April 21, the
State Enterprise Policy Committee approved a plan for realizing the part-
privatization of EGAT by selling 25 percent of the company’s shares by
November 2005, and this proposal was endorsed by the cabinet on May
10. The EGAT labor union was constrained in trying to repeat its protest
movement of the previous year by a promise from Kraisi Karnasuta, gov-
ernor of EGAT, to the effect that he would treat the company’s labor force
sympathetically following the listing of the company.
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Meanwhile eleven groups, including the Confederation of Consumer
Organizations of Thailand (CCOT) filed a petition with the
Administrative Court demanding that the two decrees for the listing of
EGAT be withdrawn and that the offer of shares in the company be pro-
hibited. On November 15, immediately before the day on which it was
planned to list the company’s shares and contrary to what most people
had expected, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the offer of
shares be suspended. This decision allowed the Supreme Administrative
Court to proceed with the hearing in due course, and the hearing itself
was eventually continued. But the government’s plan to privatize
Thailand’s biggest state enterprise with the year was in reality postponed.
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
So far as Thailand’s external relations were concerned, negotiations with
several countries for tying up free trade agreements were vigorously
promoted, driven forward by the strong personal commitment of the
prime minister. Moreover the prime minister engaged in some spectacu-
lar personal diplomacy not just with Asian countries, but with
European, Middle Eastern, and African nations, in connection with the
candidacy of his deputy, Surakiart Sathirathai, for the post of secretary-
general of the United Nations. Thaksin involved himself in overseas
travel on a greater scale than in a normal year, and managed to visit 17
countries, while the leaders of 16 countries visited Thailand. In 2005 in
particular, Thailand was energetically engaged in foreign policy inter-
changes with countries belonging to the Asian Cooperation Dialogue
(ACD), an organization for regional cooperation with the Middle East
and Asia. In addition, in a year in which relations with Africa were being
promoted, the prime minister visited several African countries, while
African leaders visited Thailand.
Beginnings of FTA Negotiations with Main Trade Partners
The Thaksin administration began negotiations for tying up free trade
agreements with New Zealand, Peru, Japan, and the United States in 2004.
As regards these negotiations, a Close Economic Partnership with New
Zealand was signed in Bangkok on April 19, 2005, and came into effect on
July 1. The foreign ministries of Thailand and Peru signed a protocol to
accelerate trade liberalization on November 19 at the APEC meeting held
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at Pusan, South Korea, the prime ministers of both countries being pre-
sent at the signing ceremony.
The trade talks with Japan had to span a very wide field, Japan being
Thailand’s main trade partner, and because there were very many vitally
important areas which needed agreement domestically, the negotiations
became very long drawn out. The Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership
Agreement was agreed in August in outline form between Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry Shoichi Nakagawa and Deputy Prime
Minister Somkid Jatusripitak and it was planned for the prime ministers
of both countries to sign the agreement during Thaksin’s planned visit to
Tokyo in April 2006. By contrast, the negotiations with the United States
proved difficult, and it seemed that they would be even more long drawn
out than those with Japan had been. In 2005, the negotiations with the
United States entered a fifth round of talks, but the fields under discussion
included difficult areas such as intellectual property rights, the environ-
ment, and labor issues and moreover, Thailand was put under pressure to
liberalize trade in services, including finance and telecommunications, a
matter that Thailand found highly problematic. Every time the negotiators
met for talks, Thai citizens’ groups and other protestors gathered close to
the building where the talks were being held, and a large-scale protest
movement developed. Voices of criticism were raised ever more strongly
over the likely lack of advantage to Thailand of a trade liberalization
agreement, as well as over the failure to provide any opportunity for
revealing information on the progress of the proceedings and the absence
of any attempt to explain the purpose of the negotiations to the people of
Thailand.
In May 2005, negotiations for entering a free trade agreement were
begun with EFTA (the European Free Trade Area) while on November
20, agreement was reached on a cooperation framework for BIMSTEC
(the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation). It was expected that this agreement would be formally
signed in January 2006 and would take effect from July of that year.
The Plan for Putting Forward a Candidate for the Post of
Secretary-General of the United Nations
The Thaksin administration, in pursuing a foreign policy intended to raise
Thailand’s international standing, had as one of its aims the promotion of
Surakiart Sathirathai, the deputy prime minister, as a candidate for the
appointment to the post of secretary-general of the United Nations, a cam-
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paign that was formally launched in March 2004 when Surakiart was for-
eign minister. After Surakiart’s candidature had been announced, things
went according to plan, with Thailand gaining the support of ASEAN and
China, and in 2005, Thaksin took every diplomatic opportunity (includ-
ing a round of visits to the United States and Europe, and visits to Africa
and the Middle East) to gain support for the Surakiart bid. However in
2005, other Asian countries, including South Korea, came up with power-
ful candidates of their own and in September, the former WTO secretary-
general Supachai Panitchpakdi, a Thai who was a former Democrat Party
member of parliament, assumed office as the new secretary-general of
UNCTAD. These developments altered the context of the Surakiart candi-
dature, and on December 21, Kasit Piromya, the former ambassador of
Thailand to the United States, speaking in Thailand said that without the
support of America, backing for the candidature of Surakiart would be a
matter of concern. The Thai mass media also tended to see the candida-
ture as a difficult prospect. Nevertheless, on December 22, the Thai
Foreign Ministry stated that it would continue with the campaign to back
Surakiart for the post of UN secretary-general.
The Pressure of World Opinion over the Southern Problem
World opinion has exerted pressure on Thailand over issues that have
been seen as problems of human rights violations by the Thai authorities,
examples being the incidents of mass killing at the Krue Se mosque on
April 28, 2004, and at Tak Bai on October 25, and the Thai government’s
reaction to the southern problem.
Abdullah Badawi, the Malaysian prime minister and chairman of the
Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC), speaking on February 19 dur-
ing his visit to Saudi Arabia, expressed his anxiety over “the permeation of
southern Thailand by incidents of violence directed against Muslims” and
indicated the need for an impartial investigation into the series of inci-
dents, and, despite the election results, the need for a development of
southern Thailand consonant with fair and globally recognized objectives.
Moreover on March 1, the US State Department published a report on
human rights violations in southern Thailand which contained details of
the mass killings of Muslims and the disappearance of Somchai
Neelapaijit, a lawyer representing Muslim defendants in southern
Thailand. The Thai government, driven by the need to dispel the “mis-
understanding” that was spreading throughout the world, sent a delegate
to the OIC conference that was held in Yemen between June 28 and 30,
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2005, dispatched a government representative to the meeting of the UN
Human Rights Commission held in Geneva on July 19 and 20, and asked
that an understanding of the reports on the incidents at Krue Se and Tak
Bai be put in the context of the ongoing terrorist situation in the south of
the country. Following this, in mid-October the new secretary-general of
the OIC made clear his anxiety over the mounting violence against
Muslims in southern Thailand. Prime Minister Thaksin’s rebuttal of this
statement (given on October 20) and of similar pronouncements height-
ened the intensity of world disapproval of the Thai administration’s reac-
tion to the problem. In the absence of any sign of a resolution of the dete-
riorating situation as regards law and order in the south, international
pressure over the problem of southern Thailand remains the biggest
weakness enveloping Thailand’s foreign policy.
Worsening Relations with Malaysia
As regards Thailand’s relations with neighboring countries, following the
political change in Myanmar in 2004, the close cooperation between
Thailand and Myanmar, helped by the strong personal friendship between
Thaksin and former prime minister Khin Nyunt (overthrown after the
political changes), was temporarily shelved, save for projects such as the
plan to build a dam across the Salween river.
Relations with Malaysia, the country that borders the southern Thai
provinces, deteriorated from 2004 onward, and ended in a state of friction
that was beyond repair, the cause being the treatment of Muslims in the
southern provinces of Thailand. The Thai side saw the conflict in terms of
the principle of the need to hold on to their territory in the context of
problems with terrorism, but Mahathir Mohammed, the former prime
minister of Malaysia, jangled nerves among the Thais when he referred to
the granting of autonomy to southern Thailand. These words were
rejected by the Thai side as interference in its domestic affairs and only
served to make the situation more complicated still.
In the midst of these developments, on August 30, 131 people from
Narathiwat Province fled over the border and took refuge in Malaysia, a
development that turned into an international incident involving the
office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Thai
government asked the Malaysian side to hand over the people who had
fled, but the Malaysian authorities refused, saying that among the people
who had crossed the border were Malaysian nationals who were com-
plaining about being investigated by the Thai police and army, and about
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the harm that they had suffered because of the deterioration of law and
order. Immediately after this incident, the foreign ministers of Thailand
and Malaysia opened up a verbal war of accusations of blame against each
other, and relations between the two countries fell to a new low. Inside
Malaysia, Islamic groups mounted demonstrations protesting against the
rough treatment of Muslims in southern Thailand, and boycotts of Thai
manufactured goods were held. On December 8, the Malaysian side
handed over to the Thai government Hamzah bin Met Saud, a person sus-
pected of having been involved in terrorist incidents in southern
Thailand, and in respect of whom an arrest warrant had been issued in
Thailand, but the return of the other people who had fled to Malaysia was
left to the voluntary will of the individuals concerned. It was hoped that
in 2006, there would be a continuation of similar cooperation between the
two countries on matters pending between them.
ISSUES IN 2006
The main point of interest in early 2006 was the widening scale of the
anti-Thaksin movement following the revelation on January 23 of the sale
by the prime minister’s family of the shares that they had held in SHIN
Corporation. A switch had occurred since Thaksin’s historic victory in the
general election of 2005, and for the first time since the democratization
of politics in 1992, political meetings attracting 80,000 to 100,000 people
began to be held in Bangkok. Prime Minister Thaksin, whose position was
now more at risk than at any other time since his administration came to
power in 2001, announced the dissolution of the Lower House in the
evening of February 24, and declared that a general election would be
held early in April. However, in the present-day confrontational structure
of Thai politics, in which the picking and choosing of policies varies as
between the cities and the countryside, even if the TRT Party were to be
reelected on the strength of rural support, there would be no way of erad-
icating the deeply rooted distrust of the prime minister himself among
urban voters, and there would be little scope among the city-based mass
media and intellectuals for supporting a reinstatement of Thaksin. In fact
after February 26, the anti-Thaksin movement showed a trend toward the
holding of large meetings calling for the prime minister’s resignation,
regardless of the dissolution of parliament and the decision to call an elec-
tion. Moreover on April 2, the three main opposition parties—the
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Democrats, Chart Thai, and Mahachon—announced their intention to
boycott the election. On March 5, 100 intellectuals presented a petition to
the King, asking that in order to provide some hope for a fair election, a
stand-in for a caretaker prime minister other than Thaksin should be
nominated to oversee the next election process.
In 2006, the main point of interest as regards domestic politics so far
has been the issue of the future of the prime minister (who has been a
caretaker prime minister since February 25, 2006). The second most
important topic will be the validity of the election, if it is held, and the
changes in power within the TRT Party. Moreover, another issue might be
the revision of the 1997 Constitution. 
Economic trends may be strongly affected by the political situation. In
particular, the megaprojects and the FTA negotiations were policies spe-
cific to the Thaksin administration and were promoted by it, and it is pos-
sible that they may take quite another direction depending on how the
political situation evolves.
From the time of the first administration onward, the Thaksin govern-
ment has greatly changed the way in which political policies are deter-
mined in Thailand as well as the content of those policies. In the short
term, the present disruption of the administration will inevitably exert a
strong influence on the continuity of domestic policies and on the stable
running of the economy. Just as at the beginning of the 1990s, when the
topics at the forefront of people’s attention were democracy and the new
Constitution, so the year 2006 will constitute an important turning point
determining the direction that Thailand will take in the early twenty-first
century.
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IMPORTANT DATES
January
1: King Bhumibol Adulyadej, in his speech in the evening of December 31
celebrating the arrival of the New Year, appealed to his people to overcome
the difficulties caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami through solidarity and
consideration for others.
11: The cabinet agreed on a tsunami relief budget of 525,550,000 baht and
established a low-interest loan facility amounting to 64.5 billion baht. 
16: The prime ministers of Sweden, Norway, and Finland visited areas affected
by tsunami damage (until January 18).
- A bomb exploded in a restaurant in Yala Province, southern Thailand.
17: First ever train collision on the Bangkok underground railway.
27: On being refused a replacement for a vehicle that had many defects, a Thai
woman publicly smashed up her Honda family car. Following this event, a
movement toward a consumer protection law gathered pace.
31: Apirak Kosayodhin, governor of Bangkok, announced a plan to extend the
Skytrain (the Bangkok Mass Transit System railway line).
February
3: The customs department of the Ministry of Finance signed a bribery pre-
vention agreement with exporters and importers.
6: Election of House of Representatives. Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party won 377
of the 500 seats being contested (announced by the Election Commission
on February 20).
8: Visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. Discussion between
the leaders of Thailand and Turkey of arrangements following the
tsunami, as well as of matters such as science and technology, tourism,
and air travel (to February 9).
14: In connection with illegal dealing at Krung Thai Bank, the Bank of
Thailand filed criminal charges against a former director of the bank and
some of the bank’s managers.
16: In the southern provinces of Yala and Narathiwat, a series of bomb attacks
on targets, including universities, hotels, and motor vehicles (bomb inci-
dents continued until March 17).
22: Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh announced his intention to
retire from politics
24: Announcement of a budget framework worth 200 billion baht for a four-
year program for the development of four main river basins.
March
2: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 2.0 percent to 2.25
percent.
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5: Banyat Bantadtan, leader of the Democrat Party, resigned following his
party’s defeat in the election, and Abhisit Vejjajiva became the new leader.
11: Second Thaksin administration formed. New cabinet established.
16: The finance minister, Somkid Jatusripitak, announced that he would
increase the price of light oil in stages. An administrative float was intro-
duced.
22: Cabinet approved a development plan for national laws, which included
the large-scale abolition of 377 legal statutes.
25: Industry Minister Wattana Muangsook proposed, in the interests of liber-
alization, to abolish the sugar and sugar cane law of 1984.
28: Establishment of National Reconciliation Commission, for conciliation of
problems in southern Thailand. Former prime minister Anand appointed
as the Commission’s chairman.
29: Cabinet announced a five-year program for the leasing of five million
cows.
April
3: Series of bomb attacks at the airport and at a supermarket in the city of Hat
Yai in Songkhla Province.
6: Deputy Prime Minister Surakiart attended a meeting of the Asian
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in Pakistan.
8: State visit of Blaise Compaore, president of Burkina Faso (to April 11).
- In an attempted crackdown on illegal extortion of protection money from
vendors, Bangkok Metropolitan Agency began the licensing of street ven-
dors.
11: Prime Minister Thaksin announced the “Third War to Clean Up Drugs.”
The emphasis was on a crackdown in areas close to the borders.
17: The prime minister of Denmark visits Thailand (to April 18). The prime
ministers of Thailand and Denmark conferred on a number of topics,
including the provision of a tsunami warning system.
19: Joint statement for signing of Close Economic Partnership (CEP) between
Thailand and New Zealand, the agreement to take effect from July 1.
- The Bank of Thailand announced the details of bank permits based on
the Finance Sector Development Plan of 2004.
25: Prime Minister Thaksin paid a state visit to Jordan (April 25) and Oman
(April 27). 
- National Telecommunications Commission published a master plan for
telecommunications, 2005–7.
- The newspaper Prachachart Turakij revealed details of a scandal over the
featherbedding of prices of explosive detection equipment at the new air-
port.
29: Birth of first baby boy to Princess Srirasmi, consort of Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn.
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30: Tsakhiyagiyn Elbegdorg, prime minister of Mongolia, visited Thailand (to
May 3). 
May
3: Cabinet approved a broad framework for next year’s budget.
4: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives confirmed that a suspected case
of infection with avian flu, for which the ministry is monitoring con-
stantly, has tested negative.
9: Shaukart Aziz, prime minister of Pakistan, visited Thailand. Meetings at
cabinet-minister level were held on the possibility of a Close Economic
Relationship between the two countries.
10: A Cabinet meeting approved the plan to sell shares in Electricity
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). 
- Government began negotiations for the formation of a free trade agree-
ment (FTA) with the four-member countries of EFTA.
13: Finance Minister Somkid Jatusripitak announced his intention to release
shares in the state-owned TOT Corporation (Thailand’s national telecom-
munications organization).
17: Cabinet decided on a Comprehensive Energy Saving Plan which will intro-
duce compulsory energy saving, and a guide to alternative energy sources.
26: The Supreme Court ruled that raising the National Counter Corruption
Commissioners’ allowances amounted to an abuse of power, and merited a
conviction under the law.
28: Opening of first cabinet conference concerning the second administrative
reform of ministries and government offices.
30: National Natural Disaster Warning Centre set up in Nonthaburi province. 
- Thailand’s Ministry of Energy and Myanmar’s Electric Power Ministry
signed an agreement to investigate the possibility of building a dam across
the Salween River.
June
1: Government launched an energy saving campaign.
3: Prime Minister Thaksin visited India and Bhutan. Topics discussed
included the promotion of trade (to June 4).
9: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 2.25 percent to 2.5
percent.
10: Andranik Margaryan, prime minister of Armenia, visited Thailand.
Discussed trade problems and other topics with Prime Minister Thaksin.
19: General Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan, visited Thailand.
Discussed free trade area negotiations with the prime minister (to June
20).
23: Yahya Jammeh, president of Gambia, visited Thailand as part of Thailand’s
initiative to strengthen its ties with Africa during 2005 (to June 27).
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27: Debate in the House of Representatives on a motion of no-confidence in
Transport Minister Suriya, put forward by the opposition parties (voted
down on June 29).
30: Prime Minister Thaksin visited China, commemorating 30 years of diplo-
matic relations between the two countries (to July 2).
- Securities and Exchange Commission filed criminal charges against the
former President of Picnic Corporation, accusing him of window-dressing
the company’s year-end results.
July
1: The Bank of Thailand set an upper limit on the amount of interest payable
by individuals on unsecured loans.
- Government’s proposed revision of article 297 of the Constitution, con-
cerning election of members of the National Counter-Corruption
Commission, passed through parliament.
4: Prime Minister Thaksin attended the summit of the Greater Mekong
Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation (to July 5).
6: Deputy Minister of Commerce Suriya resigned following the scandal that
had enveloped his family company (Picnic Corporation).
10: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives confirmed the reappearance of
avian flu in Suphanburi Province.
12: Cabinet agreed to abolish the subsidy on the retail price of light oil.
14: Sora-at Klinpratoom, minister of labor, announced a policy for legalizing
and registering foreign workers in Thailand.
- In Yala Province, a series of terrorist incidents, including the destruction
of an electricity transformer, and explosion of bombs at a hotel, a cinema,
and other places.
15: Prime Minister Thaksin opened a meeting for the presentation of the
results of the Small Medium and Large-scale (SML) Village Fund
Development Project.
16: Legislation for the Emergency Decree on Public Administration in
Emergency Situation, B.E.2548 (2005), aimed at normalizing the situation
in southern Thailand, was published. On July 17 a State of Emergency
took effect in the three southern provinces (for a three-month period).
18: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, president of Indonesia, visited Thailand (to
July 20). Signing of memoranda of understanding to boost economic coop-
eration between the two countries.
20: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 2.5 percent to 2.75
percent. 
25: Deputy Prime Minister Pinij Jarusombat announced the government’s
measures for dealing with the water shortage in the Eastern Seaboard
Industrial Estate. 
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- Alongkorn Pollabutr, deputy leader of the Democrat Party, filed an accu-
sation with the Royal Thai Police concerning suspected corrupt dealings at
the new airport by Yaowaret, the prime minister’s sister.
31: Local elections held in tambon (community) administration organizations
(TAOs) throughout the country.
August
1: Shoichi Nakagawa, Japan’s minister of economy trade and industry, and
Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak agreed on a broad framework
for a Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement.
2: Prime Minister Thaksin carried out a cabinet reshuffle.
4: National Telecommunications Commission awarded telecommunications
business licenses to TOT Corporation and CAT Telecommunications.
8: Emomali Rahmanov, president of Tajikistan, made a state visit to Thailand
(to August 12). He announced his interest in joining the Asian
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).
12: Birthday of Queen Sirikit. At a congratulatory party held on the day before
her birthday, the Queen expressed her anxiety about the deteriorating sit-
uation in southern Thailand.
18: Prime Minister Thaksin announced a plan to provide 500,000 prefabri-
cated houses to poor families.
21: A protest movement demanded an improvement in the treatment of Thai
workers being employed on a seasonal basis in Taiwan (on August 24,
Annette Lu, the vice president of Taiwan, apologized for the poor treat-
ment of these workers).
30: One hundred thirty-one residents of Narathiwat Province, southern
Thailand, fled across the border into Malaysia.
September
1: Prime Minister Thaksin and Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi confirmed a
broad framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between
Thailand and Japan (Thaksin visited Japan on August 30). 
- Supachai Panitchpakdi, secretary-general of the WTO, resigned and took
up office as secretary-general of UNCTAD.
2: Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore had a private meeting with
Prime Minister Thaksin in Chiang Mai (to September 3). 
- Proposals for the 2006 budget bill passed through the House of
Representatives.
7: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 2.75 percent to 3.25
percent. 
- Foreign Minister of Thailand signed a treaty arrangement with Hong
Kong outlawing double taxation.
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8: Prime Minister Thaksin paid a state visit to Morocco, and discussed vari-
ous topics with Prime Minister Driss Jetou.
12: GMM Media Corp. announced a plan to take over the two Thai newspa-
pers Matichon and Bangkok Post.
13: Prime Minister Thaksin attended the second ASEAN-UN Summit in New
York. He went on to attend the High-Level Plenary Meeting (HLPM) of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (September 14–16).
14: Prime Minister Thaksin signed the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism at the headquarters of the
United Nations.
15: The television broadcaster Channel 9 canceled the transmission of a polit-
ical program chaired by Sondhi Limthongkul, the founder of the newspa-
per Phujadkarn. 
19: Prime Minister Thaksin in Washington, D.C. for talks with President
Bush. Among the topics discussed were FTA problems and the forthcom-
ing appointment to the post of secretary-general of the United Nations. 
20: Two marine soldiers killed in a village in Rangae district, Narathiwat
Province.
27: The Senate elected members of the National Broadcasting Commission.
29: Prime Minister Thaksin inspected the preparations for the opening of
Suvarnabhumi airport and takes a ride on a test flight.
October
1: Commencement of large-scale infrastructure investment plan
(Megaprojects).
- Annual military reshuffle of 620 military positions. Deputy Commander
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin became the first ever Army commander-in-
chief to be a Muslim.
- Prime Minister Thaksin announced the “Fourth War to Clean Up
Drugs.”
5: Public Health Minister Suchai Charoenratanakul announced his intention
to resign on October 31. 
9: Prime Minister Thaksin set off with a party of officials on a tour of Europe
(France on October 11, Belgium and the European Commission on 12th,
Britain on 13th, Finland on 14th, Russia on 15th). Discussions with the
heads of these various countries (to October 16).
11: Prime Minister Thaksin delivered a speech at the 33rd Congress of
UNESCO, held in Paris.
- Prime Minister Thaksin filed libel charges in the civil and criminal courts
against the newspaper Pujadkarn Daily. 
12: Together with José Manuel Barroso, Chairman of the European
Commission, Prime Minister Thaksin attended the signing ceremony for a
Joint Statement on Partnership and Cooperation between Thailand and the
EU.
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- Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu announced a plan to cut the number of
civil servants by half by 2008.
14: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 3.25 percent to 3.75
percent.
16: A monk and two temple boys killed in a Buddhist temple in Pattani
Province, southern Thailand, and the temple was set ablaze during the
attack.
18: Cabinet acknowledged the plan to restructure general individual loans.
State of Emergency in the three southern provinces extended for a further
three months.
19: The first death this year of a person infected by avian flu.
20: Prime Minister Thaksin issued a rebuttal of a statement from the
Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) which expressed anxiety over
“violence against Muslims in southern Thailand.”
25: Over 2,000 farmers staged a sit-in in front of the Office of the Prime
Minister, demanding a settlement of their debt problem.
26: Attacks at more than 60 places in the three southern provinces. The armed
criminals concerned engaged in large-scale robbery of weapons.
31: Prime Minister Thaksin carried out his second cabinet reshuffle.
November
1: The Senate elected new members of the National Counter-Corruption
Commission.
2: Conference of leaders of the Ayeyawady—Chao Phraya—Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) opened in the official resi-
dence of the prime minister (to November 3).
3: Airing of suspicions of a kidnapping of a Thai woman by North Korea.
Evidence was made available of the woman’s identity.
8: A demonstration by several thousand teachers outside the Office of the
Prime Minister, over the transfer of state schools to local administrative
organizations control.
- Prime Minister Thaksin visited Kenya and Turkey (to November 12).
12: Guy Verhofstadt, prime minister of Belgium, visited Thailand. Both prime
ministers conferred on the possibility of direct flights between the two
countries and attended a signing ceremony on a treaty of mutual assistance
in criminal matters and a treaty on the transfer of sentenced persons and
cooperation in the enforcement of penal sentences.
15: Supreme Administrative Court ruled that a new offer of shares by
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) be suspended.
18: Prime Minister Thaksin traveled to South Korea to attend the Pusan meet-
ing of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
19: Prime Minister Thaksin, accompanied by Donald Tsang, the Chief
Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, attended a signing
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ceremony in Hong Kong in respect of the promotion and protection of
investment.
- Signing of an understanding on the early-harvest scheme in respect of an
FTA with Peru.
20: Prime Minister Thaksin attended the summit meeting of the Boao Forum
for Asia, in China.
22: Opening of the second conference on the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced
Economic Relationship (STEER) in Bangkok.
23: Central Administrative Court ruled that the selection of the members of
the National Broadcasting Commission was invalid.
28: Privy Counsellor Surayud Julanont warned Sondhi (who was leading an
anti-Thaksin movement) and Thaksin to be discreet in making references
to the royal family.
30: Parliament debated a proposal for amendment of the Act of
Decentralization Plan and associated procedures. Some 30,000 teachers,
who want the wording of the proposal to be changed, gathered in
Bangkok.
December
5: Birthday of the King: In a speech delivered in the evening of December 4,
the King remarked that those who were above other people must be aware
of their own errors and be tolerant of the criticism of others.
6: Following the King’s speech, Prime Minister Thaksin withdrew his libel
suits against Sondhi.
8: The Malaysian authorities, responding to a request from the Thai side,
handed over a person suspected of being involved in terrorist activities in
southern Thailand. 
9: Some 80,000 people attended a rally led by Sondhi, who continues to criti-
cize the administration.
11: Prime Minister Thaksin visited Malaysia (to December 14) and took part
in a meeting on the “Triangle of Growth” with the leaders of Malaysia and
Indonesia. He also attended the 11th ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting (December
12) and the Southeast Asia Leaders’ Conference (December 14).
14: The Bank of Thailand raised the 14-day repo rate from 3.75 percent to 4
percent.
- Finance Minister Thanong Bidaya announced a proposal for the intro-
duction of a compulsory savings system for state pensions, with effect
from 2006.
15: King Abdullah of Jordan visited Thailand.
16: President Yudhoyono of Indonesia and Prime Minister Thaksin held a
meeting on cooperation in fields such as energy, trade, and fisheries (State
visit of President Yudhoyono, December 15 to 17).
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20: Following the winding-up of the Asset Management Company (AMC), the
cabinet agreed on a policy to transfer the company’s assets to Bangkok
Commercial Asset Management Co. Ltd.
26: The government held ceremonies to mark the first anniversary of the
Indian Ocean tsunami.
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APPENDIX 11.1:  ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE
THAI STATE (as of December 2005)
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Parliament
House of Reperesentatives/Senate
The Monarchy
Prime Minister
Privy Council
Judiciary
Cabinet
Office of the Prime Minister
Offices under the Office
of the Prime Minister
(1) Office of the Permanent
      Secretary
(2) Public Relations Department
(3) Consumer Protection Board
Offices under the Prime 
Minister
(4) Secretariat of the 
      Prime Minister
(5) Bureau of the Spokesman
(6) Bureau of the Budget
(7) National Economic and 
      Social Development Board
(8) Council of State
(9) Civil Service Commission
(10) Office of the National 
       Security Council
(11) National Intelligence 
       Agency
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Justice
 Office under the Minister of
 Justice 
 (1) Narcotics Control Board
Ministry of Industry
Office under the Minister of
Industry
 (1) Board of Investment
Ministry of Commerce
Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Labour
Ministry of Culture
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Information and
Communication Technology
Ministry of Energy
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Tourism and Sports
Ministry of Natural Resource
and Environment
Ministry of Science and Technology
Ministry of Social Development
and Human Security
Constitutional Court
Administrative Court
Courts of Justice
  Supereme Court
  Court of Appeal and Regional
  Courts of Appeal
  (1) Provincial Courts
  (2) Small Claims Courts
       (San Kweang)
  (3) Civil Courts
  (4) Criminal Courts
  (5) Specialized Courts (Juvenile,
        Bankruptcy, Tax, Labor, 
        Intellectual Property,
        International Trade)
Election Commission
Ombudsman
National Human Right Commission
National Counter Corruption
Commission
Auditor General
National Economic and Social
Advisory Council
Independent Organizations
established by the 1997
Constitution
Independent Public Agencies
Office of His Majesty’s
Principal Private Secretary
Bureau of the Royal Household
Office of National Buddhism
Office of the Royal
Development Projects Board
National Research Council
of Thailand
The Royal Institute
Royal Thai Police
Bureau of Crown Properties
<Independent agencies under the
 Minister of Justice>
 (1) Anti-Money Laundering Office
 (2) Office of the Attorney General
<Independent agencies under the 
 Parliament>
 (1) Secretariat of the House of
        Representatives
 (2) Secretariat of the Senate
Bank of Thailand
Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration (BMA)
Securities and Exchange
Commission
Source: From the Council of State, Homepage of the Office of the Prime Minister.
APPENDIX 11.2: THE CABINET LINEUP OF THE
THAKSIN ADMINISTRATION II
(His Majesesty the King issued a royal command to approve this Cabinet on
March 11, 2005.)
Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra 
Deputy Prime Minister
Somkid Jatusripitak
Chidchai Vanasatidya
Wissanu Krea-ngam
Surakiart Sathirathai 
Chaturon Chaisang 
Pinij Jarusombat 
Minister attached to the Office of Prime Minister
Suranand Vejjajiva
Minister of Defense
Thammarak Isarangura Na Ayuthaya
Minister of Finance
Somkid Jatusripitak 
Deputy Minister of Finance
Varathep Ratanakorn 
Chaiyos Sasomsub
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kanthathi Suphamongkhon
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Preecha Laohaphongchana
Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Sudarat Keyuraphun 
Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Newin Chidchob
Minister of Information and Communication Technology
Suwit Khunkitti 
Minister of Commerce
Thanong Bidaya
Deputy Minister of Commerce
Suriya Lapvisuthisin (resigned in July)
Minister of Interior
Chidchai Vanasatidya
Deputy Minister of Interior
Sermsak Pongpanit
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Somchai Sunthornvut
Minister of Justice
Suwat Liptapanlop
Minister of Labor
Sora-at Klinpratoom
Minister of Natural Resource and Environment
Yongyuth Tiyapairat
Minister of Education
Adisai Bodharamik
Deputy Minister of Education
Rung Kaewdaeng
Minister of Culture
Uraiwan Thienthong
Minister of Public Health
Suchai Charoenratanakul
Deputy Minister of Public Health
Anutin Charnvirakul
Minister of Industry
Watana Muangsook
Minister of Transport
Suriya Jungrungreangkit 
Deputy Minister of Transport
Phumtham Wechayachai
Adissorn Piengket
Minister of Tourism and Sports
Somsak Thepsutin
Minister of Social Development and Human Security
Pracha Maleenont
Minister of Energy
Viset Juphibal
Minister of Science and Technology
Korn Thapparangsi
Source: Homepage of the Prime Minister’s Office.
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APPENDIX 11.3: MAJOR STATISTICS
Thailand | 327
Population (millions, year end)
Working population (millions, year end)
Increase in consumer prices (%)
Unemployment rates (%)
Exchange rates (US$ 1 = baht)
62.24
33.22
1.6
3.6
40.16
2000
62.67
33.92
1.6
3.2
44.48
2001
63.14
34.25
0.7
2.2
43
2002
63.66
34.85
1.8
2
41.5
2003
64.2
35.82
2.7
2
40.28
2004
64.76*
36.2
4.5
1.7
40.29
2005
1. General
Source: Population figures from 2000 to 2004 inclusive are taken from Asian Development 
Bank, Key Indicators, 2005 (p.384); all other figures are from the Bank of Thailand’s home 
page at http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/EconData/EconData_e.htm. 
Note: * taken from a survey done in July 2005 by the National Statistics Office.
Private consumption expenditure
Government consumption expenditure
Gross fixed capital formation
Change in inventories
Exports of  goods and services
Imports of goods and services
Expenditure on gross domestic product (GDP)
GDP
Net factor income from abroad
Gross National Product
Source: National Economic and Social Development Bureau home page at
http://www.nesdb.go.th/econSocial/macro/NAD.htm#9gdp. 
Note: * indicates preliminary figures.
2,762.9
557.8
1,081.4
42.7
3,287.3
2,862.3
4,869.9
4,924.2
-77.3
4,846.9
2000
2,941
581.1
1,181.3
55.8
3,380.8
3,047.6
5,092.4
5,132.6
-82.8
5,049.8
2001
3,120
603.9
1,243.2
54.1
3,499
3,134.3
5,385.9
5,451.5
-89.2
5,362.3
2002
3,388.5
635.3
1,423.9
53.6
3,886.6
3,485.3
5,875.5
5,928.9
-112.1
5,816.9
2003
3,687.6
721.3
1,686.8
75
4,587.9
4,281.9
6,476.7
6,504
-126.8
6,376.7
2004*
4,043.7
838.8
2,057
188
5,232.9
5,338.6
7,022
7,103
-172.1
6,928.3
2005*
(Billion baht)
2. Gross National Product by Type of Expenditure (at current prices)
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Agriculture, livestock, forestry  & fishery
   Of which agriculture, livestock, forestry
Mining & quarrying
Manufacturing
Construction
Electricity, gas & water supply
Transport & communications
Wholesale and retail trade
Financial services
Real estate and renting activities
Public Administration and defence
Services
Gross domestic product (GDP)
GDP growth (%)
Source: Same as Table 2.
Note: * indicates preliminary figures.
309.9
 259.2
64.2
1096.2
76.3
97.6
290.4
474.8
84
120.3
95.3
299.4
3008.4
4.8
2000
320
270.2
64.6
1111.5
76.5
103.9
310.1
469.6
85.8
122.4
98.8
310.4
3073.6
2.2
2001
322.2
272.4
71.7
1190.8
80.6
110.1
331.2
479.7
95.7
128.4
105.3
321.3
3237
5.3
2002
359
303.6
76.6
1317.2
82.9
115.2
341.3
494.4
111.7
134.9
108.3
322.9
3464.7
7
2003
341.8
284.2
80.2
1425
91.2
122.5
367.4
521.5
126.4
144.4
110
348
3678.5
6.2
2004*
333.5
274.5
87.6
1503.5
97.4
128.9
387.1
538
140.2
150.7
112.7
363
3842.5
4.5
2005*
(Billion baht)
3. Gross Domestic Product by Industries (at constant 1988 prices)
4. Foreign Trade by Country and Area
Japan
NAFTA
  USA
EU
  Germany
  United Kingdom
ASEAN
  Singapore
   Malaysia
   CLMV
China
Hong Kong
Taiwan
South Korea
   Total
(Million baht)
Source: The Bank of  Thailand home page, at 
http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/EconData/EconData_e.htm.
Note: CLMV consists of Cambodia, Viet Nam, Laos, and Myanmar. Figures for EU are totals 
for 25 countries, including the 10 new member countries as of May 2004.  * indicates 
preliminary figures.
2002
427,023
635,145
579,072
438,370
65,895
102,635
582,130
238,241
121,628
93,797
152,592
158,165
84,598
60,017
2,923,941
Exports
639,104
288,851
265,804
303,909
105,413
36,637
467,277
124,683
156,370
53,728
211,707
39,046
124,751
108,459
2,774,840
Imports
2003
472,264
621,172
565,096
488,467
74,418
107,117
684,948
243,109
160,508
118,188
236,058
179,134
107,193
65,816
3,326,015
Exports
755,894
319,683
296,331
314,137
105,080
38,525
521,924
135,321
187,617
55,892
251,072
44,457
133,719
120,643
3,137,924
Imports
2004*
541,758
683,920
622,725
577,549
72,355
121,793
852,592
282,009
213,250
152,213
285,754
198,287
104,557
74,535
3,874,824
Exports
901,122
317,766
291,197
378,964
114,374
51,204
640,372
167,368
223,479
77,929
329,662
53,594
160,129
144,305
3,810,171
Imports
2005*
605,582
743,482
683,097
600,185
80,035
112,350
965,768
300,542
229,062
191,233
368,045
246,911
108,541
90,666
4,436,676
Exports
1,048,236
378,557
349,437
432,900
128,749
51,429
870,142
216,522
325,477
118,267
448,991
60,433
181,149
155,824
4,756,000
Imports
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5. Balance of Payments
Current account balance
   Trade balance of goods
      Exports (f.o.b.)
      Imports (c.i.f.)
   Service balance
      Transportation
      Travel
      Other service
   Income balance
      Compensation of employees
      Investment account
      Current transfers 
Capital and financial account
   Direct investment
   Portfolio investment
      Shares (equity securities)
      Bonds (debts securities)
   Other investment
Net errors and omissions
Reserve asset changes
Source: Same as Table 4.
Note: * indicates preliminary figures.
274,810
110,951
2,802,530
-2,691,579
198,190
74,666
183,827
-60,303
-61,034
55,606
-116,640
26,703
-203,550
157,950
-40,034
15,404
-39,511
-321,466
-13,694
-57,566
2001
302,029
118,224
2,837,663
-2,719,439
215,348
79,253
197,944
-61,849
-57,465
59,251
-116,716
25,922
-181,574
37,014
-70,537
23,212
-54,507
-148,051
60,366
-180,821
2002
329,180
155,587
3,233,116
-3,077,529
208,750
70,682
203,851
-65,783
-74,071
66,571
-140,642
38,914
-334,456
60,545
-5,118
72,283
-37,580
-389,883
7,455
-2,179
2003
274,964
58,793
3,822,802
-3,764,009
211,001
76,904
221,892
-86,795
-81,836
65,124
-146,960
86,006
-20,500
51,837
86,663
14,471
22,755
-159,000
-24,537
-229,927
2004*
-144,442
-339,716
4,400,726
-4,740,442
196,007
50,773
205,437
-60,203
-121,558
47,664
-169,223
120,826
267,022
132,252
159,173
208,546
12,137
-24,403
98,857
-221,437
2005*
(Million baht)

